

Message Text

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INFO JCS WASHDC
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CINCUSAFE
USCINCEUR
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USCINCEUR FOR J5.

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: NATO, OCON, AWACS MILI
SUBJ: NATO AEW DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING, MARCH 25, 1977

REF: A. USNATO 1733 DTG 252125Z MAR 77
B. USNATO 1727 DTG 251937Z MAR 77.

SUMMARY: ON MARCH 25, THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE
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MET IN MINISTERIAL SESSION TO DECIDE ON THE NEXT STEP IN
THE NATO AEW PROGRAM. MINISTERS AGREED THAT THE ALLIANCE
SHOULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY THE SYSTEM COULD PROVIDE,
BUT FAILED TO REACH SUFFICIENT AGREEMENT ON COST SHARES
AND SUFFICIENT COMMITMENT TO KEEP THE UK MINISTER FROM
RESERVING HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON HOW IT SHOULD
MEET THIS NEED. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN AND OTHERS
BELIEVED THAT NEARLY ALL MINISTERS HAD GONE AS FAR AS
THEY COULD BY COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO SUPPORT THE PROGRAM
BEFORE THEIR GOVERNMENTS. HOWEVER, UK MINISTER MULLEY

INSISTED THROUGHOUT THE MEETING THAT HE NEEDED MORE THAN JUST ANOTHER AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO ALLOW HIM TO CANCEL NIMROD IN FAVOR OF A NATO AEW FORCE. HE ARGUED THAT SINCE THE UK'S AGING SHACKLETON FORCE MUST BE REPLACED IN THE EARLY 1980'S, ANY FURTHER DELAY IN A REPLACEMENT DECISION WOULD LEAVE A GAP IN THE ALLIANCE'S EARLY WARNING COVERAGE. END SUMMARY.

1. SYG LUNS OPENED THE MEETING BY STATING HE HOPED THAT A PROCUREMENT DECISION COULD BE AGREED. HE SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDED AN AEW SYSTEM FROM THE MILITARY VIEWPOINT AND ALSO TO SIGNIFY ALLIANCE COHESION. IT WOULD BE MOST REGRETTABLE IF THE ALLIANCE WERE TO BE WEAKER AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS. HE HOPED THAT MINISTERS' FREE AND OPEN DISCUSSIONS, WHATEVER THE RESULT, WOULD BIND THE ALLIANCE CLOSER TOGETHER AND THAT REPORTS TO THE WORLD WOULD SHOW THIS COHESION.

2. CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE (MC), SIR PETER HILL-NORTON, SPEAKING AT HIS LAST MINISTERIAL MEETING, SAID THE MILITARY CASE FOR NATO AEW WAS CLEAR AND UN-EQUIVOCAL. NEITHER THE MC, THE MNCS, NOR THE ASYG FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT FIND ANY REASON TO MODIFY OR DILUTE THIS MILITARY VIEW THAT ACQUISITION OF SUCH A FORCE WOULD PROVIDE A QUANTUM IMPROVEMENT IN MILITARY TERMS.
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THE COST AND COMPLEXITY OF MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS ARE BECOMING SO GREAT THAT NO NATION CAN GO IT ALONE. THIS FACT COMPELS THE ALLIES TO WORK TOGETHER. A FAVORABLE DECISION TO PROCURE NATO AEW WOULD BE AN EMPHATIC NOTICE THAT NATO INTENDS TO COUNTER THE LOW LEVEL AERIAL THREAT AND WOULD DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE DETERMINATION AND SOLIDARITY. TAKEN AGAINST THE TOTAL COST OF AIR DEFENSE, NATO AEW OFFERS A VERY LARGE RETURN FOR COSTS THAT ARE SMALL IN TERMS OF TOTAL EXPENDITURE FOR AIR DEFENSE. FINALLY, A NEGATIVE DECISION ON PROCUREMENT OF NATO AEW WOULD BODE ILL FOR OTHER PROJECTS LOOMING ON THE HORIZON.

3. ASYG (DEFENSE SUPPORT) LABERGE PROVIDED A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE NATO AEW PLANNING. LABERGE ALSO REVIEWED THE POSITIONS OF FRANCE AND GREECE WHO WERE NOT REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS NOT MODIFIED ITS DECEMBER POSITION, I.E. FRANCE IS NOT IN A POSITION TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CAPITAL COST OF THE PROJECT, PARTICULARLY IN SO FAR AS AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT IS CONCERNED, BUT IT WOULD LIKE TO HAVE DETAILED ESTIMATES OF THE COSTS OF SUBSCRIBING TO THE SYSTEM. ON MINISTERS BEHALF, LABERGE HAD SUBMITTED ONE PROPOSAL TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SHOWING

IT AS A 10 PERCENT SUBSCRIBER. THIS PROPOSAL WAS REJECTED. RECENTLY THE FRENCH HAVE SHOWN SOME UN-OFFICIAL INTEREST IN A PROPOSITION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE CFM-56 ENGINE. THE GREEK AUTHORITIES HAVE TOLD LABERGE THAT AWACS SHOULD GIVE FULL COVERAGE TO GREEK AIRSPACE, THAT LOCATION OF A FORWARD OPERATING BASE IN GREECE WOULD INFLUENCE GREECE'S FINAL POSITION, THAT GREECE'S O&M SHARE SHOULD BE THE SAME AS ITS ACQUISITION SHARE, AND THAT A 27 AIRCRAFT FORCE IS A MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE REQUIREMENT.

LUNS THEN OPENED THE GENERAL DISCUSSION BY SUGGESTING THAT MINISTERS ADDRESS THE KEY ISSUES OF HOW

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NATIONS VIEWED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SYSTEM AND WHETHER THE NATIONS BELIEVED THEY COULD SUPPORT IT IN THE FINANCIAL WAY PROPOSED.

4. MULLEY (UK) WAS FIRST TO SPEAK. HE SAID THAT, AT THE LAST MEETING, IN DECEMBER 1976, HE HAD SPECIFIED THE UK POSITION ON NATO. THAT POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED. HE WAS HERE TODAY TO LISTEN. HOWEVER, HE WOULD REMIND HIS COLLEAGUES OF THE STATEMENT HE MADE IN DECEMBER THAT: (1) THE UK RECOGNIZES THE NEED FOR NATO AEW AND IS PREPARED TO SUPPORT IT; AND (2) THE UK NEEDED A DECISION QUICKLY. HE SAID THAT NOW, THREE AND A HALF MONTHS LATER, ALLIES WERE HERE TO DISCUSS A PROJECT TO WHICH THE UK HAD BEEN EAGER TO AGREE FOR MANY MONTHS. IN JUNE 1976, MINISTER MASON HAD STATED THAT HIS DECISION ON NATO AEW COULD NOT BE POSTPONED BEYOND DECEMBER OF THAT YEAR; THEREFORE, THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN ON CLEAR NOTICE SINCE THAT TIME OF THE UK'S CRITICAL TIMETABLE. MULLEY SAID HE WILL NEED TO REPORT THE OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING TO PARLIAMENT ON MONDAY AND HE WANTED A FIRM, FULLY WORKED-OUT PROGRAM APPROVED TODAY. IT APPEARED TO HIM THAT ONLY 56 PERCENT OF THE PROGRAM WAS FUNDED NOW AND THAT 44 PERCENT WAS STILL UNDECIDED. IF MINISTERS COULD NOT REACH FIRM AND FULLY WORKED-OUT DECISIONS TODAY, THE UK 17 PERCENT WOULD HAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE QUESTION MARK COLUMN, LEAVING ONLY 39 PERCENT OF THE PROGRAM COVERED AND 61 PERCENT DOUBTFUL. BASED ON THIS RECKONING, HE COULD NOT SEE HOW THERE COULD BE A COLLECTIVE SCHEME.

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5. DANSON (CANADA) SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT MINISTERS
WERE HERE ONCE AGAIN AT THE SAME POINT AT WHICH THEY
LEFT OFF IN DECEMBER. HE SAID IT WAS INCUMBENT ON THE
ALLIANCE TO REACH ALLIANCE-WIDE AGREEMENT; FAILURE TO
DO SO TODAY WOULD CERTAINLY MAKE THIS AN ISSUE AT THE
MAY SUMMIT MEETING IN LONDON. HE SAID HE WAS PREPARED
TO SEEK HIS CABINET'S APPROVAL IF ALL THE OTHER MINISTERS
COMMITTED THEMSELVES TODAY, SO THAT AT THE NEXT MEETING
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IN MAY, MINISTERS COULD APPROVE THE PROGRAM.

6. HANSEN (NORWAY) SUPPORTED THE PROJECT AND SAID HE
WOULD RECOMMEND TO HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE CABINET THAT
THEY ALSO SUPPORT IT. HE ASSUMED THAT THE COST SHARING
FORMULA WOULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIALLY ALTERED, THAT THERE
WOULD BE AN ACTIVE PROGRAM TO UPDATE THE GROUN ENVIRON-
MENT USING INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS, AND THAT PAYMENT
SCHEDULES COULD BE COORDINATED WITH THE NORWEGIANA LONG-
TERM BUDGET SO THAT NORWEGIAN PAYMENTS WOULD COME DUE
IN 1984-86. HE POINTED OUT THAT NORWAY WOULD INSIST
ON THE RIGHT TO APPROVE THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS OF AN
AEW FORCE FOR THEIR AREA, CONSISTENT WITH THEIR POLICY
OF PRESERVING A "SITUATION OF LOW TENSION."

7. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BROWN READ A BRIEF STATEMENT
FROM PRESIDENT CARTER, THE TEXT OF WHICH WAS REPEATED
REF A, TO INDICATE THE IMPORTANCE WITH WHICH THE US
REGARDS THE ALLIANCE AND THESE AEW DELIBERATIONS. HE

SAID THAT THE US WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT STRONG DETERRENT FORCES -- INCLUDING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR, THEATER NUCLEAR, AND CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES. WITHIN THE ALLIANCE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, THE US BELIEVED THE MAJOR EFFORT SHOULD BE TO STRENGTHEN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, BUT THE US BELIEVED THAT EFFECTIVE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE COULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY THROUGH FULL ALLIED COOPERATION. THE US WAS PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO SUCH AN ALLIANCE EFFORT, AND AS THE PRESIDENT SAID, HIS ADMINISTRATION HAS ADDED FUNDS TO THE US BUDGET TO IMPROVE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE. SECRETARY BROWN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATE WARNING AND CONTROL TO ASSURE THAT EXPENSIVE AIR ASSETS COULD PERFORM EFFECTIVELY. THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF THE ALLIANCE AGREED, HE NOTED, THAT THE AWACS BEST MEETS THE CRITICAL MILITARY REQUIREMENT TO IMPROVE WARNING AND CONTROL. HE ADDED THAT NATO AEW WILL STRENGTHEN ALLIANCE POLITICAL COHESIVENESS DURING CRITICAL PERIODS THROUGH THE INTELLIGENCE AND COMMAND AND CONFIDENTIAL

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CONTROL CAPABILITY IT PROVIDES.

8. SECRETARY BROWN SAID THAT THE US HAS BEEN ASKED SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST MONTHS TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY. THE US HAS DONE SO BY WAIVING ASSESS USE CHARGES, BY OFFERING OFFSET AGREEMENTS, BY AGREEING TO FRONT LOAD US FUNDING, BY REQUESTING REIMBURSEMENT FOR ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF R&D EXPENDITURES ON THIS PROGRAM, AND BY OFFERING TO INCREASE THE US SHARE IN PROCUREMENT TO 33 PERCENT. THE US WAS ALSO PREPARED TO EXPLORE MEANS OF RECIPROCALLY LOWERING OR ELIMINATING "BUY-NATIONAL" IMPEDIMENTS TO THE TWO-WAY STREET. HE ADDED THAT LIKE-MINDED FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF OTHERS COULD MAKE A NATO AEW SYSTEM A REALITY.

9. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT MINISTERS WERE ASKING THEMSELVES A SIMPLE QUESTION, AND WOULD BE HEARD BY THEIR OWN PEOPLE AS WELL AS OTHERS: IS NATO PREPARED TO INVEST THE REQUIRED RESOURCES TO ENSURE A Viable AIR DEFENSE IN THE 1980S, OR WILL THE ALLIANCE ACCEPT WHAT COULD WELL BE A PERMANENT AND DANGEROUS DEFICIENCY?

10. LEBER (FRG) SAID THAT ANY MEETING OF DEFENSE MINISTERS WHICH DID NOT RESULT IN POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENT WOULD BE NOTED AS A FAILURE OF THE ALLIANCE. NATO AEW WAS NOT ONLY A SYSTEM TO PREVENT SURPRISES, BUT ALSO HAD SYMBOLIC VALUE WITH RESPECT TO ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY. HIS GOVERNMENT SAW AN IMPORTANT CAPABILITY AND ROLE FOR NATO AEW, BUT ALSO SAW A MAJOR FUNDING PROBLEM. "MY NATION SAYS YES TO AWACS," HE STATED, ADDING THAT THE FRG WAS PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE ITS SHARE OF FUNDING, BUT WOULD NEED TO CLARIFY WHAT THIS SHARE WAS. NEGOTIATIONS HAD NOT REACHED A STATE OF MATURITY YET TO DECIDE ON SHARES, SINCE THIS WOULD

DEPEND ON THE NUMBER OF PARTICIPATING NATIONS. THERE
WERE DIFFERENT CAPABILITIES AMONG THE ALLIANCE NATIONS
TO PUT UP FUNDS, BUT EACH NATION COULD PUT UP SOMETHING.
ESTABLISHING HOW MUCH WAS THE TASK FOR THE DAY. HE
SAID THAT HE COULD "NOT SAY YES TODAY" TO A SPECIFIC
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FRG SHARE OR PERCENTAGE, BUT THAT THE PERCENT SHARE
WOULD DEPEND ON THE UNDERSTANDING ACHIEVED BY THE
ALLIANCE. FRANCE WAS NOT HERE, BUT FRANCE ALSO
CONSIDERED AEW AN IMPORTANT CAPABILITY. HENCE, NO
STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN WITHOUT EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY
OF FULL FRENCH PARTICIPATION. HE RECOMMENDED THAT
SYG LUNS INITIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH AND
INVITE THEM TO TAKE PART IN THE NATO AEW PROGRAM.
LEBER SAID HIS GOVERNMENT NEEDED TIME TO STAFF SUCH A
POLITICAL DECISION, NOTING THAT GERMANY HAD BEEN LOOKING
AT AEW FOR ONLY TWO YEARS. IF APRIL 1 WAS THE DEADLINE
FOR POLITICAL DECISION, HE WOULD REPORT ON APRIL
2 THAT GERMANY HAD NOT DECIDED. HE ALSO SAID THAT ONE
HAD TO SEE THE SYSTEM BEFORE ONE SPENT FUNDS ON IT AND
ONLY RECENTLY HAD HE BECOME AWARE OF THE WAY IN WHICH
THE SYSTEM INCREASED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR DEFENSE
AIRCRAFT. WHAT WAS THE DEGREE OF THIS INCREASE IN AIR
DEFENSE CAPABILITY CONSIDERING THE COST, AND WHAT WOULD
BE ACHIEVED IF, INSTEAD, ALLIES SPEND FUNDS ON SAM AND
ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS? THESE WERE QUESTIONS WHICH
NEEDED TO BE ANALYZED BEFORE ONE DECIDED. HE SAID
THAT HE WAS SPEAKING SPECIFICALLY ABOUT AWACS AND DID
NOT WANT TO MAKE A COMPARISON WITH NIMROD, BUT HE WAS
SURE THAT FURTHER COSTS WOULD BE INVOLVED IN MAKING
A MIXED FORCE INTEROPERABLE. CONCLUDING, HE SAID THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC SAID "YES" TO AWACS, AND THIS ALSO
MEANT A CONTRIBUTION IN FUNDING AWACS, BUT THE OTHER
CONDITIONS HAD TO BE CLARIFIED IN DETAILED TALKS AND
POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION BY FRANCE HAD TO BE FULLY EXPLORED.

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11. LUNS POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN DEMONSTRATIONS AND
BRIEFINGS ON AWACS AND THAT ALL THE TECHNICAL AND MILITARY
INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE. HE ALSO SAID HE WOULD APPROACH
THE FRENCH VERY SOON.

12. REPLYING TO LEBER'S QUESTION ON INCREASED
CAPABILITY, HILL-NORTON SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY
QUANTITATIVELY HOW MUCH BETTER AIR DEFENSE WOULD BE
WITH AWACS. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE MULTIPLIER EFFECT
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OF AWACS, THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT IN THE MINDS
OF MILITARY AND TECHNICAL PERSONS THAT IT WAS A QUANTUM
JUMP WHICH WOULD TREMENDOUSLY IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF ALL THE OTHER COMPONENTS OF NATO AIR DEFENSE. APART
FROM PROVIDING EARLIER WARNING THAT COULD NOT BE
PROVIDED BY ANY NUMBER OF GROUND BASED RADARS, THE
SYSTEM PROVIDED CAPABILITY TO DIRECT SAMS AND FIGHTERS
AND TO IDENTIFY CONCENTRATIONS OF OPPONING FORCES.

THERE WAS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE AEW SYSTEM, AND A SIMILAR
AMOUNT OF MONEY SPENT ON SAMS WOULD BE WASTED, SINCE
THERE ARE ALREADY SUFFICIENT SAMS IF PROPERLY DIRECTED.

13. NOTING THAT HIS PARLIAMENT HAD BEEN DISSOLVED,
PENDING NATIONAL ELECTIONS ON APRIL 17, VANDENBOEY-
ANTS (BELGIUM) SAID HE COULD NOT COMMIT HIS GOVERN-
MENT. AS HE HAD SAID BEFORE, BELGIUM WOULD MODIFY ITS
GROUND ENVIRONMENT AND PARTICIPATE IN OPERATION OF THE
SYSTEM. ALSO, IF ALL NATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE AGREED
TO THE PROGRAM, HE WAS SURE BELGIUM WOULD FOLLOW SUIT.

14. STEMERDINK (NETHERLANDS) SAID THE NATO AEW PROJECT
HAD NOT BEEN A GOOD EXAMPLE OF NATO EQUIPMENT PLANNING.
IN THE NETHERLANDS, AS IN OTHER COUNTRIES, THIS PROJECT
WOULD HAVE TO BE SQUEEZED INTO EXISTING NATIONAL PLANS.
THE RESULTING REORDERING OF PRIORITIES WOULD CAUSE
SEVERE PROBLEMS, AND THE EFFECT OF SUCH SHIFTING ON

THE WHOLE NATO DEFENSE PLAN WOULD HAVE TO BE ASSESSED BY THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. HE CALLED FOR THE NMAS TO ESTABLISH RELATIVE PRIORITIES IN ALL FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THIS NATURE AND MAGNITUDE. NEVERTHELESS, HE PERSONALLY WOULD SUPPORT THE NATO AEW PROGRAM WITH HIS PARLIAMENT, PROVIDED FINANCIAL EXPERTS WORK OUT OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

15. TURKISH PERMREP KIRCA SAID THAT TURKEY HAD DECIDED TO ACCEPT ITS PART OF PROCUREMENT COSTS; \$20 MILLION WOULD BE TAKEN OUT OF FUTURE BUDGETS. TURKEY WAS CONVENED THAT ITS CONTRIBUTION WAS A FAIR SHARE OF ITS CAPABILITY TO PAY. HOWEVER, FOR O&M FUNDING,

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TURKEY COULD NOT ACCEPT A PERCENTAGE GREATER THAN THAT FOR PROCUREMENT. ALSO, A PRIOR CONDITION TO PARTICIPATION IN PROCUREMENT WOULD BE THAT A FORWARD OPERATING BASE BE LOCATED IN TURKEY TO INSURE FULL COVERAGE OF TURKISH AIR SPACE. IN ADDITION, MINISTERS WOULD HAVE TO AGREE IN ADVANCE THAT AIRCRAFT COULD OVERLAY AND LAND WITHOUT RESTRICTION IN COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN OR BENEFITTING FROM THE SYSTEM, WITH NO LIMITATIONS BECAUSE OF AIR SPACE CLAIMS. THE SAME WOULD HAVE TO APPLY TO TRANSMISSION OF DOWN-LINKED INFORMATION.

16. PERMREP FISCHBACH SAID THAT LUXEMBOURG HAD ALWAYS AGREED TO THE NEED FOR NATO AEW, AND WOULD PARTICIPATE IF OTHER ALLIES ALSO PARTICIPATE.

17. LATTANZIO (ITALY) SAID THAT, APART FROM OTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF AN OPERATIONAL NATURE, THE FINANCIAL BURDENS OF NATO AEW WERE BEYOND THE CAPABILITIES OF ITALY. HE THANKED HIS COLLEAGUES FOR ACKNOWLEDGING THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF ITALY, BUT SAID THAT ITALY COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE ACQUISITION OF THE PROGRAM. ITALY WAS EXPENDING AVAILABLE RESOURCES ON IMPROVING COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ITS AIR DEFENSE FORCES; THIS WAS THE MAXIMUM THAT COULD BE DONE. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT HIS COUNTRY COULD NOT FUND MORE WITHOUT SACRIFICING OTHER PRIORITIES. THIS SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS A LACK OF ITALIAN COMMITMENT TO THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE, HE SAID, ADDING THAT THE ITALIAN POSITION MAY BE RECONSIDERED IN THE FUTURE.

18. DANISH PERMREP SVART SAID DENMARK CONSIDERED 24-HOUR SURVEILLANCE OF THE BALTIC AIRSPACE AS A MOST URGENT REQUIREMENT WHICH COULD BE MET ONLY BY GROUND-BASED RADAR. HOWEVER, DENMARK WANTED TO DO ITS PART FOR THE ALLIANCE AND WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE NATO AEW PROGRAM ON CONDITION THAT DENMARK'S SHARE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN PROPOSED, THAT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS WOULD BE USED TO UPGRADE THE LOW-LEVEL RADAR COVERAGE, AND THAT A CEILING WOULD BE PLACED ON OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COSTS. HE

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SAID HIS DEFENSE MINISTER WOULD WANT TO CONDUCT MORE DISCUSSIONS ON NATO AEW IN COPENHAGEN BEFORE SUBMITTING IT TO PARLIAMENT.

19. PORTUGUESE PERMREP FREITAS-CRUZ SAID PORTUGAL INTENDED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WHOLE PROGRAM BUT COULD NOT PARTICI-PATE WITH THE INDICATED PERCENTAGE SHARE. PORTUGAL WANTED THE INFRASTRUCTURE FORMULA APPLIED TO GROUND ENVIRONMENT COSTS AND THE CIVIL BUDGE FORMULA APPLIED TO ADMINISTRA-TIVE COSTS. PORTUGAL WASOFFERING A SYMBOLIC CONTRIBUTION TO AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT OF \$50 THOUSAND. PORTUGAL WAS FAVORABLE TO THE USE OF PORTUGUESE BASES BY THE NATO AEW FORCE.

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20. SUMMARIZING THE FIRST TOUR OF THE TABLE, LUNS NOTED ALLIES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ITALY, WERE PREPARED TO ADOPT THE SYSTEM, SUBJECT TO NECESSARY PARLIAMENTARY PROCESSES. MULLEY DID NOT AGREE, AND SAID ANOTHER AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE, WHICH WAS ALL HE COULD SEE HAD BEEN REACHED, WAS NOT ENOUGH. HE THOUGHT ONLY THE US, UK, AND

PERHAPS CANADA, HAD COMMITTED TO THEIR SHARES -- FOR A TOTAL OF ABOUT 60 PERCENT. HE AGAIN NOTED THE NEED TO
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REPLACE SHACKLETON, WHICH WOULD NOT WAIT. HE COULD NOT RISK DELAYING REPLACING THE SHACKLETON IN THE EARLY 1980S. IF THE ALLIANCE DELAYED FURTHER AND IF THE UK CANCELLED NIMROD, THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE WITHOUT ANY AEW CAPABILITY. FOR THE MEETING TO ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING POSITIVE, MULLEY SAID, MINISTERS MUST DO MORE THAN ENDORSE IN PRINCIPLE THE NEED FOR AN AEW CAPABILITY. BUT, AS IN THE CASE OF AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT SUCH AS F-16 AND MRCA, DID THE EARLY WARNING SOLUTION REALLY NEED TO BE BASED ON ONLY ONE SYSTEM? SHOULD MINISTERS NOT LOOK AT A MIXED OR HYBRID FORCE WHICH WAS COMPLETELY INTEROPERABLE? HE SAID THE UK DID NOT WANT TO DO THIS, AND IT WOULD COST THE UK MORE FOR NIMROD THAN FOR ITS SHARE IN NATO AEW, BUT UNLESS MINISTERS COULD SIGN A MOU VERY SOON, THE UK WOULD HAVE TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION.

21. LUNS OBSERVED THAT MINISTERS' COMMITMENT TO SUBMIT THE PROGRAM TO THEIR PARLIAMENTARY PROCESSES WAS ALL THAT COULD BE HOPED FOR TODAY. BECAUSE OF THE ALLIED DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, ANY DECISIONS BY MINISTERS WOULD HAVE TO RECEIVE PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL.

22. LEBER SAID HE UNDERSTOOD MULLEY'S POSITION AND NOTED THAT IN THIS MORNING'S SESSION HE HAD SAID "YES" TO NATO AEW. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AGREED IN PRINCIPLE THAT A NATO AEW SYSTEM WOULD BE PURCHASED FOR NATO, BUT SUCH AGREEMENT APPLIED TO THE ONE SYSTEM BASED ON THE AWACS AIRCRAFT. HE THEN SUMMARIZED AVAILABLE RESOURCES AS FOLLOWS: US AND UK COMBINED TO GIVE 51 PERCENT, AN ILLUSTRATIVE GERMAN SHARE OF, SAY, 20 PERCENT, AND A CANADIAN SHARE OF 7 PERCENT TO 8 PERCENT WOULD ADD UP TO 80 PERCENT. IF 14 PERCENT OF COSTS WERE BORNE BY FRANCE, THE THE REMAINING 6 PERCENT COULD CERTAINLY BE BORNE BY THE OTHER NATIONS.

23. HANSEN SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD CARRY ITS
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SHARE OF THE PROGRAM. HE ADMIRED THE PATIENCE WHICH THE UK HAD SHOWN, BUT IT WAS HIS OWN BELIEF THAT THE NATO AEW PROGRAM HAD PROGRESSED AT A FAIRLY RAPID PACE. THE IMPORTANT ISSUE INVOLVED WAS REALLY POLITICAL: THE DETERMINATION OF THE ALLIANCE TO MAINTAIN A CAPABLE DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE.

24. DANSON SAID HE ALSO RECOGNIZED MULLEY'S PROBLEM

AND OFFERED TO GO BACK TO OTTAWA AND BREAK SOME RULES TO ATTEMPT TO GET HIS GOVERNMENT'S APPROVAL BY APRIL 1. BUT HE SAID HE COULD NOT GO BACK AND SELL A FRAGMENTED SYSTEM. THEIR WHOLE ATTITUDE HAD BEEN BASED ON COHESION AND THE DETERMINATION THAT WAS BEING SHOWN WITHIN NATO, AND ON STANDARDIZATION AND OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS. IF THEY WERE TO EXAMINE SOMETHING DIFFERENT, THEY WOULD HAVE TO KNOW PRECISELY WHAT IT WAS BECAUSE THERE COULD NOT BE THREE SEPARATE SYSTEMS: NATO AEW, NORAD AWACS, AND UK NIMROD.

25. MULLEY RETURNED TO HIS MIXED FORCE IDEA, SAYING THAT SUCH A FORCE WOULD GIVE THE ALLIANCE TIME TO WORK OUT THE PROBLEMS OF FINDING THE BEST WAY TO MEET THE REST OF THE NEED. HE SAID AGREEMENT ON A COMPLETELY INTEROPERABLE MIXED FORCE WOULD ALSO PERMIT A POSITIVE, SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE MEETING. HE ATTACHED AS MUCH IMPORTANCE TO FRENCH PARTICIPATION AS HIS COLLEAGUES, BUT RE-ENGINEERING THE AIRCRAFT TO GET FRENCH PARTICIPATION WOULD SURELY CAUSE AT LEAST A YEAR'S DELAY.

26. LEBER SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT MULLEY NEEDED A CLEAR AND DEFINITE OPINION FROM THIS MEETING TO GIVE HIS PARLIAMENT. FOR HIS OWN PART, HE HAD CONSULTED WITH HIS CHANCELLOR, THE FEDERAL CABINET AND THE FEDERAL SECURITY COUNCIL. IN ADDITION, HE HAD DISCUSSED HIS POSITION WITH THE DEFENSE AND BUDGET COMMITTEES OF THE BUNDESTAG. THUS, HIS STATEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE WITH THE CONFIDENTIAL

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APPROVAL OF THE CABINET AND THE BUNDESTAG COMMITTEES, BUT HE DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO GO FURTHER.

27. SECRETARY BROWN ALSO AGREED THAT THE IDEA OF A MIXED SYSTEM WOULD GIVE VERY GREAT DIFFICULTY TO A NUMBER OF NATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE WHOLE QUESTION OF NATO AEW. HE SAID THAT IF THE ALLIANCE MISSED THIS OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE ITS DEFENSIVE POSTURE, THE APPEARANCE, POLITICALLY, BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCE, WOULD BE ONE OF LACK OF COHESION AND OF A MISSED OPPORTUNITY OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. HE THEN SUGGESTED A 20-MINUTE RECESS SO THAT MINISTERS COULD REVIEW THEIR POSITIONS.

28. WHEN MINISTERS RECONVENED IN RESTRICTED SESSION, LATTANZIO SAID THAT IN SPITE OF HIS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND STRONG INSTRUCTIONS, HE COULD TABLE A SYMBOLIC CONTRIBUTION IN ORDER TO MAKE A STEP FORWARD; THERE COULD BE NO FAILURE HERE TODAY.

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SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO JCS WASHDC

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OSAF WASHDC

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USCINCEUR

USLOSACLANT

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SD. ESD FOR YWT. AMEMB THE HAGUE, PASS TO RADLO FOR MIRMAN.

USCINCEUR FOR J5.

29. SECRETARY BROWN NOTED THE DECEMBER 1976 DPC MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE STATING THAT THE PRESENT MEETING WAS TO ENDORSE THE PROGRAM, "SUBJECT TO DECISIONS THROUGH NATIONAL PROCESSES." ALMOST ALL MINISTERS HAD MADE SUCH COMMITMENTS, AND THIS WAS MUCH MORE THAN AN "IN PRINCIPLE" COMMITMENT, EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE STILL DETAILS ON COSTS SHARES AND OFFSETS TO BE WORKED OUT.

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30. MULLEY REITERATED THAT THIS WAS NOT ENOUGH, IT WAS STILL AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE. HE WANTED TO "GO AROUND THE TABLE" TO SEE WHO WOULD COMMIT MONEY AND COMMIT HIMSELF TO THEN GO TO PARLIAMENT FOR APPROVAL. HE REPEATED THE NEED FOR AEW IN THE EARLY 1980'S. LUNS ADDED UP PERCENTAGE SHARES ONCE MORE: US 33 PERCENT; FRG, 20 PERCENT; CANADA, 8 PERCENT; NORWAY, 1 PERCENT; THE UK, 18 PERCENT - TOTALLING 80 PERCENT. THE OTHERS WERE NOT HARD AND FAST, ALTHOUGH BELGIUM AND NETHERLANDS WOULD GO TO THEIR PARLIAMENTS. HE SUGGESTED ADDING SOMETHING FOR FRANCE - ALTHOUGH FRANCE WAS A DEFINITE QUESTION MARK. MULLEY THEN ASKED FROM WHERE WOULD THE LAST 20 PERCENT

COME. COMMENT: WE NOTE THAT SYG LUNS ACCEPTED THE EARLIER FRG "ILLUSTRATION" OF A 20 PERCENT FRG SHARE, AT LEAST FOR PURPOSES OF THIS DISCUSSION, EVEN THOUGH NO FORMAL OR ILLUSTRATIVE PROPOSAL BY NATO HAS EVER BEEN FORMULATED WITH THE FRG CONTRIBUTION THIS SMALL. END COMMENT.

31. DANSO, OBSERVING AN IMPASSE, SUGGESTED A FINANCIAL EXPERTS MEETING ON MARCH 28-29 TO WORK MORE ON THE COST SHARING PROBLEM. MULLEY REPEATED THE NEED FOR A DECISION BY MINISTERS.

32. LEBER SAID IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIS FINANCIAL EXPERT TO DO MORE ON MONDAY. HE CALLED FOR MORE TIME AND REMINDED THE GROUP THAT THE FRG SAID YES TO AWACS, BUT THAT HIS MENTION OF 20 PERCENT HAD BEEN UNOFFICIAL. HE SAID HE HAD NOT YET COMMITTED THE FRG TO A SPECIFIC SHARE.

33. HOLST (NORWAY, REPLACING HANSEN WHO HAD LEFT) SAID HE BELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN A BROAD COMMITMENT AND THAT THE SOLUTION SHOULD BE AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM BASED ON ONE AIRCRAFT. NORWAY COULD NOT COMMIT ITSELF UNCONDITIONALLY, BUT WOULD WORK HARD TO REACH THAT COMMITMENT THROUGH NATIONAL PROCESSES.

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34. HILL-NORTON SUGGESTED THAT MINISTERS' PROBLEMS MIGHT BE EASED IF THE PROGRAM WERE STRETCHED MORE IN TIME. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT MISS THIS OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE ITS DEFENSES. BOTH MULLEY AND LEBER INTERPRETED HILL-NORTON'S SUGGESTION ON STRETCHING THE PROGRAM TO MEAN PROCURING FEWER THAN 27 AIRCRAFT. LUNS CORRECTED THIS MISINTERPRETATION.

35. SECRETARY BROWN AGREED THAT STRETCHING A 27 AIRCRAFT FORCE MORE IN TIME WOULD MAKE FINANCING LESS BURDENOME. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE PROGRAM COULD BE PHASED OPERATIONALLY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE UK CONCERN, I.E., EMPLOY THE FIRST AIRCRAFT IN THE AREAS NOW COVERED BY THE SHACKLETON FORCE.

36. STEMERDINK ASKED IF THE UK COULD NOW JOIN ALLIES IN SUPPORT OF AWACS. MULLEY SAID HE WOULD CONVEY EACH OF THE NATIONAL POSITIONS TO HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES, BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE HE HAD ENOUGH EVIDENCE OF THE COLLECTIVE WILL OR ENOUGH OF A GUARANTEE ON FUNDING TO JUSTIFY CANCELING NIMROD.

37. SECRETARY BROWN OBSERVED THAT IF DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES WERE NOT IN THE PICTURE, THE STATEMENTS MADE BY MINISTERS WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS CONSTITUTING SIGNIFICANT COMMITMENTS, FULFILLING THE SENSE OF THE DECEMBER COMMUNIQUE.

LUNS AGREED THAT HE HAD NEVER THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GO FURTHER AT THIS MEETING THAN TO GET COMMITMENTS BY MINISTERS TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED PROGRAM IN THEIR GOVERNMENTS. MULLEY SAID HE WOULD TRY THESE RESULTS ON HIS COLLEAGUES IN LONDON, BUT THAT HE HAD TO LEAVE THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN EARLY NIMROD DECISION.

38. LUNS THEN TURNED TO THE COMMUNIQUE, BUT MULLEY THOUGHT THERE SHOULD BE NO COMMUNIQUE. SECRETARY BROWN,
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DANSON, LEBER AND OTHERS INSISTED THAT WITHOUT A COMMUNIQUE THERE WOULD BE UNLIMITED SPECULATION AND AS MANY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RESULTS AS INTERPRETERS. SECRETARY BOWN SAID THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD NOT IGNORE UK RESERVATIONS DEALING WITH THE MIXED FORCE, BUT IT SHOULD ALSO PERMIT A STRONG STATEMENT BY THE MAJORITY. SEVERAL MINISTERS NOTED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD NOT RAISE FALSE HOPES.

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CSAF WASHDC
OSAF WASHDC
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USCINCEUR
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
USNMR SHAPE
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USCINCEUR FOR J5.

39. AFTER A SHORT RECESS THE MINISTERS RESUMED IN OPEN SESSION FOR DISCUSSION OF THE COMMUNIQUE. SVART RETURNED, AFTER HAVING TALKED TO MINISTER MOLLER IN COPENHAGEN, WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO RESERVE, IN WRITING, DENMARK'S POSITION IN THE COMMUNIQUE. HE SAID HIS MINISTER NEEDED MORE TIME TO STUDY THE PROBLEM BEFORE HE COULD AGREE TO TAKE THE NATO AEW PROJECT TO HIS PARLIAMENT. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, LUNS CONVINCED SVART THAT, IF
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DENMARK'S RESERVATIONS WERE ADDED TO THE COMMUNIQUE, OTHERS MIGHT ALSO WISH TO ADD RESERVATIONS. SVART AGREED TO ALLOW LUNS TO REPRESENT THE DANISH POSITION AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING THE MEETING.

40. MINISTERS AGREED THE COMMUNIQUE (REF B) WHICH INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING POINTS SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY COMPETENT AUTHORITIES:

-- SUPPORT FOR NATO AEW AND A DECISION TO ESTABLISH AN AWACS SYSTEM;
-- DETAILS OF COST SHARING AND SOME OTHER OPEN QUESTIONS WILL BE WORKED OUT RAPIDLY;
-- GOVERNMENTS WILL TAKE ALLPOSSIBLE STEPS TO ESTABLISH AN AGREED COPERATIVE PROGRAM BY JULY 1, 1977.
THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO INCLUDED MULLEY'S RESERVATION AS TO THE BEST WAY IN WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT COULD MAKE ITS CONTRIBUTION.

41. MILITARY ASSISTANT TO SECDEF HAS REVIEWED THIS MESSAGE AND APPROVED ITS RELEASE. STRAUSZ-HUPE

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